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1 In 1989, the military government changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Using either ‘Burma’ or ‘Myanmar’ has since become a
highly politicised issue.The UN system uses Myanmar, but for the sake of consistency we have chosen to use Burma, which is the way
the country is referred to in the large majority of English language press and other publications.
2 In September,TNI undertook a mission to the Thai/Burmese border, to Rangoon and into the Wa hills in Shan State.We visited groups
in armed opposition; met with civil society organisations; had extensive discussions with ceasefire groups; talked to drug control offi-
cials of the military government in Rangoon; spoke with UNODC representatives in the capital and local staff of the Wa Alternative
Development Project and visited villages dependent on poppy cultivation.
E D I T O R I A L
Sword of Damocles is hanging over the
Shan State in Burma (Myanmar)1, the
area where by far the majority of the
country’s opium is produced. In the
Kokang region, an opium ban was
enforced last year, and by mid-2005 no more poppy
growing will be allowed in the Wa region.The enforce-
ment of these bans will directly threaten the livelihoods
of some 250,000 families in the Shan State who depend
on the opium economy.They add another chapter to
the long and dramatic history of drugs, conflict and
human suffering in the country.
In this issue of Drugs & Conflict we present the key find-
ings from a TNI research mission to Thailand and Burma
which aimed to assess the extent of the unfolding
drama and talk openly to all sides involved.2 Our con-
clusions and our doubts are based on the discussions
we had, and on the expertise we have gathered over
the years in the fields of drugs and conflict and the sit-
uation in Burma.The complex nature of the issues poses
many dilemmas and requires carefully designed drug pol-
icy responses –both at the local level as well as inter-
nationally- to enable the country to move towards
development, national reconciliation and democracy.
With this publication, we want to stimulate and bring
nuance to the currently very polarised debate on inter-
national engagement with Burma. Between political
pleas for strict sanctions aimed at pressuring for a
democratic transition in Rangoon,and the efforts of the
SPDC military government to hold onto power, little
attention is being paid to developments at the local level
in zones as remote as Kachin State and the Kokang and
Wa regions, in Shan State.
Rural communities risk being sacrificed in an effort to
comply with international pressures about drug-free
deadlines and US drug control certification conditions,
as well as drug-related security concerns from neigh-
bouring countries. In response to such pressures, offi-
cials in Rangoon and local authorities are trying to curry
favour with the international community by announc-
ing harsh measures against illicit crop production.Com-
munity livelihoods face being crushed between the pin-
cers of the opium ban and tightened sanctions.
In December 2003, we will convene an international
conference in Amsterdam in cooperation with the
Burma Centre Netherlands to discuss the dilemmas for
drug policy responses in this context. We intend to
improve the terms of the debate on peace and democ-
ratisation based on a better understanding of what is
happening on the ground in the ceasefire regions and
within the opium-growing communities.
A gradual and sustainable decrease of the illicit drugs
economy could have positive impacts on the HIV/Aids
crisis in Burma, which is largely related to intravenous
drug use. It may also reduce the concerns related to
drug trafficking in the region, such as the epidemic of
ya ba (methamphetamines) in Thailand, serviced main-
ly from production facilities in Burma. It could diminish
the levels of corruption and the distortion of power
relations that result from the revenues earned by armed
groups -  those under ceasefire agreements and those
still in armed opposition,or by the military government.
History has shown that few of the parties to the con-
flict can claim innocence insofar as deriving income from
the illicit economy goes. Demonising one specific play-
er in the field,as often occurs,usually has stronger roots
in politics than in evidence.
To achieve a sustainable decrease, alternative sources
of income for basic subsistence farmers have to be
secured. Enforcement of the current tight deadlines
does not allow alternatives to be in place in time, in spite
of genuine efforts undertaken by UNODC and other
international agencies. A humanitarian crisis will occur,
jeopardising the fragile social stability in the poppy grow-
ing areas.
Without adequate resources, the longer-term sustain-
ability of ‘quick solutions’ is highly questionable. Since
local authorities are eager to comply with promises
made, law enforcement repression is likely to increase,
with human rights abuses and more displacement a
potential outcome.The only viable and humane option
lies in a simultaneous easing of drug control deadline
pressures and increasing international humanitarian aid
efforts. Both require stronger international engage-
ment of a different kind to that we have seen so far.
“The real point about opium in the
Wa States and Kokang is that opium
is the only thing produced which
will pay for transport to a market
where it can be sold. To suppress
opium in Kokang and the Wa States
without replacing it by a crop
relatively valuable to its bulk,
would be to reduce the people to the
level of mere subsistence on what
they could produce for food and
wear themselves or to force them to
migrate.” [1937]1
ong ago, in the mountains of Loi Mu lived
a beautiful woman named Ya Lem, also
known as Nang Hong Loi Mu (the Beau-
ty of Loi Mu).Many eager young suitors
came to seek her hand in marriage.
However, she could only select one, which proved
impossible, causing her great consternation.So she
killed herself. From the breast of her corpse sprout-
ed tobacco, and from her groin came poppy. And
so,since that time, the Wa people have raised tobac-
co and poppy. [Wa legend]2
The Wa authorities have committed them-
selves to a region-wide ban on opium to be
implemented in June 2005, after the spring
harvest. In the Kokang area, a ban already went
into effect last year.The Wa legend of Ya Lem
is drawing to a close, and again the story will
not see a happy ending.
The words of the Shan commissioner remain
as valid today as they were in 1937. Around
250,000 households living at subsistence level
which depend on the opium economy will be
deprived of half their income or be forced to
migrate. Stressing the seriousness of the 2005
deadline,Wa leader Bao Yu-xiang is even will-
ing to follow in the footsteps of the Beauty of
Loi Mu, vowing: “I’m ready to chop off my head
if we don’t make it”.
The Opium Economy
After Afghanistan, Burma is the world’s sec-
ond largest producer of opium, the raw mate-
rial from which heroin is produced. Accord-
ing to the latest opium survey of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) for Burma in 2003, “the potential
opium production was estimated to range
between 560 and 1,060 tons,with a mean value
of 810 tons.This represented a decrease of 4%
compared to last year.”3 Measured in hectares
cultivated, the survey claimed a decrease of
23%, from a mean estimate of 74,600 poppy
hectares in 2002 to 57,200 this year. About
90% of the opium poppy is grown in the Shan
State,with the Wa and Kokang Special Regions
alone accounting for about 40-50 per cent.
The US State Department, using other meth-
ods and reaching different figures, confirmed
the pattern that “opium production declined in
Burma for the sixth straight year in 2002.The sur-
vey found that the maximum potential yield for
opium in Burma in 2002 totalled 630 metric tons,
down 235 metric tons (or approximately 26 per-
cent) from 2001. Over the past six years, opium
production in Burma has declined by more than
75 percent, from an estimated 2,560 metric
tons in 1996 to 630 metric tons in 2002.The area
under cultivation has dropped by more than half,
from 163,100 hectares in 1996 to approximate-
ly 77,000 hectares in 2002.”4 Figures from the
US survey team for 2003 are revealing an even
more significant reduction of 37% in terms of
hectares compared to 2002.
The consistent decline in opium statistics for
Burma over the past few years has led to opti-
mistic statements at Vienna UNODC head-
quarters.“The vicious linkage between opium and
poverty is being broken.Until recently the elimina-
tion of opium cultivation in the “Golden Triangle”
would have been considered impossible. It is now
within reach. However, countries need assistance
to sustain legal activities and alternative crops.With
the support of the international community, an
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1 John S. Calgue, former Federated Shan State commissioner, 1937; quoted in Ronald Renard, The Burmese Connection:
Illegal Drugs and the Making of the Golden Triangle, Lynne Rienner, Boulder/London 1996, p. 38.
2 Takano Hideyuki, The Shore beyond Good and Evil,A report from inside Burma’s Opium Kingdom, Kotan Publishing 2002.
3 Myanmar Opium Poppy Survey 2003, UNODC 2003.
www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/myanmar_opium_survey_2003.pdf
4 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2002, US Department of State,Washington, March 2003.
important and painful chapter of world drug his-
tory is coming to an end” Executive Director
Antonio Maria Costa said at the launch of the
latest opium surveys for Laos and Myanmar.5
“If helped to sustain the current momentum,
South-East Asia could well become a minor source
of illicit opium by the year 2008. Such a tremen-
dous achievement would close a 100-year chap-
ter in the history of drug control.”6
On a global scale, in 1998, the UN General
Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs
set a ten-year target: to eliminate or signifi-
cantly reduce the cultivation of opium poppy
by the year 2008.7The South-East Asia region
has jointly committed to making the area
drug-free by 2015, but in the case of opium
cultivation, they adhere to the tight UN tar-
get, saying: “The growing of illicit opium poppy
should be eliminated in the region by year 2008
as referred to by UNGASS. Accordingly, 33%
reduction of all illicit production will be achieved
by 2003, and 66% by the year 2005.” 8
The anti-drugs strategy of the military govern-
ment, the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) in Rangoon follows the
regional aim to achieve a drug-free country by
2014. In 1999, the 15-Year Plan for Elimination
of Narcotic Drugs was adopted, divided into
three 5-year phases, covering production and
consumption of all illicit drugs. Regarding
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5 Decline of Opium Cultivation in the “Golden Triangle”, Press Release, United Nations Information Service,
UNIS/NAR/801, 18 June 2003.
6 Encouraging Progress towards still distant goals, Progress Report by the Executive Director as a contribution to the Mid-
term (2003) Review of UNGASS, UNODC/ED/2, 8 April 2003.
7 A/RES/S-20/2, Political Declaration, General Assembly 20th Special Session, 10 June 1998, Article 19.
8 ACCORD (ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs) Plan of Action “In pursuit of
a drug-free ASEAN 2015”. www.unodc.un.or.th/accord/plan.htm
Measuring opium production figures is not an
exact science. The UNODC International Crop
Monitoring Programme (ICMP) now covers
Afghanistan, Burma, Laos, Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia. The methodology combines data from
satellite remote sensing and ground surveys. In
the case of Burma, the survey was conducted for
the second year. The broad range used in the fig-
ures for 2003 (49,500-71,900 hectares; 560-1,060
tons) indicate that error margins are recognised
to be substantial. Several factors contribute to the
uncertainties. Firstly, the aerial and ground sur-
vey was only done for the Shan State and the
final national figure was based on a random per-
centage for poppy cultivation taking place else-
where in the country. “Based on eradication
reports, it was estimated that about 8% of the cul-
tivation took place outside of the Shan State in
2002. To establish a national figure, the survey
analysts assumed that the proportion remained
the same in 2003.” 1 Secondly, because the Shan
State itself is already a huge area with limited
accessibility, a sampling approach was chosen in
which about 13% of all villages was surveyed and
the findings were then extrapolated to the entire
State. Thirdly, since poppy fields in Shan State are
small (83% of the fields measured in the 2003 sur-
vey were smaller than 0.15 hectare per house-
hold) and the resolution of most of the satellite
pictures used quite low, clear distinctions
between poppy fields and for example bean fields
are almost impossible to make. Part of the extrap-
olations are for that reason based on estimated
high or low ‘potential for poppy cultivation’ rather
then ground-truthed actual poppy cultivation.
Finally, calculations of yield of opium gum per
hectare are still unreliable and can differ hugely
from year to year and from township to township.
For this year, differences in yield have been
reported ranging as wide as from 4 to 37 kg/ha,
with the average set at 13 kg/ha. Considering all
these factors, several observers suspect that the
UNODC production figures for the Northern
Shan State may be too high, while expanding
poppy growing in other areas of the country not
covered in detail by the survey may be underes-
timated.
Best Guesstimates
1 UNODC, Myanmar Opium Poppy Survey 2003
poppy cultivation, the rollout-plan foresees
Kachin State and the Northern and Eastern
Shan State, fully opium- free by 2009, the
Southern Shan State for two-thirds free, and
the final 5-year phase dealing with remaining
illicit crops in Southern Shan, Kayah and Chin
States. The government stresses that if ade-
quate international assistance is made avail-
able, “the drugs elimination plan could well be
implemented in a shorter period than it has
been originally planned.” 9
The SPDC drug control strategy contains
highly controversial repressive measures, such
as obligatory registration and compulsory
treatment for drug users and military forced
eradication operations against farmers.
Between 1985-1988 the United States sup-
ported the government in carrying out aeri-
al chemical-spraying operations of opium
fields using the herbicide 2,4-D (one of the
ingredients also used in the Agent Orange
mixture), similar to what the US was doing at
the time in Guatemala.The government has
built a huge ‘Drug Elimination Museum’ in the
capital where these and other anti-drug oper-
ations are heralded, such as the regular drugs
destruction ceremonies where large quanti-
ties of confiscated opium and heroin are
burned and thousands of bottles with synthet-
ic drugs are crushed under a steamroller. In
terms of ‘Alternative Development’, the gov-
ernment prefers big infrastructure projects
such as dams, electricity plants, bridges and
factories.Given the largely top-down author-
itarian approach to society, the absence of
government involvement in any serious com-
munity development involving poppy farmers
is perhaps unsurprising, if unfortunate.
Too fast, too soon..
One major worry is that the pace of reduc-
tion and eradication is not matched by  the
capacity to create alternative livelihoods in a
sustainable manner.According to the Ministry
of Defence, in the poppy season from Octo-
ber 2001 to March 2002,7,500 hectares were
eradicated.10 “We hope to cut opium production
by 50% in the current production year,” 2002-
2003, said the Joint Secretary of Burma’s Cen-
tral Committee for Drugs Abuse Control
(CCDAC), police colonel Hkam Awng. In
response, Rangoon representative of
UNODC Jean-Luc Lemahieu warned: “A 50%
reduction is revolutionary and we should be happy
with that. But it’s too fast, too soon. I don’t see
enough income coming in for the opium poppy
farmers and I’m concerned that we’ll have a
humanitarian crisis on our hands as a result.” 11
Both the Wa and the Kokang authorities have
issued a ban prohibiting and severely penalis-
ing all drug-related activities: from cultivation
and production, to trafficking and consump-
tion.The Kokang ban was agreed to in mid-
1997, with the original aim of declaring the
region an opium-free zone by the 2000/2001
poppy season.12 Forced eradication started
T
N
I
D r a w i n g  t o  a  C l o s e ?
T h e  O p i u m  E c o n o my  a n d  t h e  P e n d i n g  B a n
6 D r u g s  a n d  C o n f l i c t  n o  9  -  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3
9 For a description of the 15-Year Plan for Elimination of Narcotic Drugs and details about the breakdown into three
phases, see: www.myanmar-narcotic.net/eradication/anti3.htm
10 UNODC, Myanmar Opium Poppy Survey 2002.
11 Fighting Burma’s drugs trade, BBC News - Wednesday, 11 December, 2002.
12 The opium poppy season in Burma is from September-March, with sowing mainly taking place in the months Sep-
tember/October and harvesting in February/March.
early in 1998, reducing the cultivated area by
one-third. The elimination target date was
then extended to the 2002/2003 season.The
impact of last year’s enforcement of the ban
appears to be confirmed by comparing figures
from the 2002 and 2003 opium surveys.The
three townships largely falling under the
Kokang Special Region, saw a 60% reduction
in hectares under cultivation.13 Overall, for
the whole Northern Shan State a 50%
decrease was reported. According to
UNODC the “reason for this decrease is attrib-
uted to farmers’ compliance with the Govern-
ment’s request not to plant opium poppy.”14
Non-Kokang townships in the Northern Shan
State that showed steep reductions were the
ones short-listed on the SPDC township pri-
ority targets for the first 5-year phase. The
largest increases in poppy cultivation this year
have been reported from the Northern Wa
Special Region and Central Shan State, which
suggests a displacement of crops because of
the increased pressure
in the upper Shan State.
For the Wa region, the
law includes a provision
that opium farmers will
have their crops
destroyed if they do not
comply with the 2005
deadline.15 Imprison-
ment has been men-
tioned as an additional
sanction to ensure compliance with the ban.16
From the Kokang region several cases have
been reported of farmers being detained, but
no data are available to indicate how wide-
spread this repression is. A recent UNODC
humanitarian assessment confirmed signs of
an unfolding drama in Shan State, according to
Mr Lemahieu: “What is evident is the drastic cut
in acreage in north-eastern Shan State, including
Kokang areas. A joint humanitarian assessment
team visited the Kokang in early May and came
back with the positive news of drastic opium
reduction there, but an alarming humanitarian sit-
uation concerning the fate of the opium farmers
and their families. Fast intervention is required.”17 
The assessment team reported from Kokang
for example that after the opium ban, in some
townships,up to 30% of the parents were tak-
ing their children out of school for want of
money for tuition and school materials. Basic
education is a privilege that has only slowly
become available to most Kokang inhabitants
since the 1989 ceasefire.Prior to the ban,80%
of the approximately 13,250 households
(106,000 people) in the area grew opium,pri-
marily to buy rice.The up-to-USD 500 earned
annually per family from growing poppies was
sufficient to secure rice year round, and pay
for other basic needs like clothing, health
care and education.The situation is growing
critical; in the absence of revenue from opium
as the main cash crop,
food shortages have
started occurring. The
World Food Programme
has recently started
bringing in emergency
assistance for distribu-
tion of rice to former
opium-farmers and their
families, in partnership
with several internation-
al NGOs.
The troubles witnessed in the Kokang region,
while grave, will pale before those that are to
come when the full implication of living with-
out poppy becomes clear, warned the assess-
ment team. Moreover, given the much higher
populated Wa hills, the problems encoun-
tered in Kokang will repeat themselves many
times over in the Wa region if the situation is
not dealt with proactively.18
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13 For the three townships Kunglong, Lawkai and Konkyan in 2002 together an amount of 12,672 hectares was report-
ed, down to 5,081 in 2003.Though township boundaries do not exactly coincide with those of the Special Administra-
tive Region, these figures do give a good indication of developments in the Kokang region.
14 UNODC, Myanmar Opium Poppy Survey 2003, op. cit.
15 Wa Region to Become Drug-free by 2005: But What’s Next? ODCCP Eastern Horizons, No. 10, June 2002.
16 Interview with UWSA Central Committee members, Panghsang, 12 September 2003.
17 Making Inroads,An Interview with Jean-Luc Lemahieu,The Irrawaddy Online Vol. 11-No.4, May 2003.
18 Replacing Opium in Kokang and Wa Special Regions, Shan State, Myanmar, Joint Kokang-Wa Humanitarian Needs
Assessment Team, Official Report, UNODC, May 2003.
The troubles witnessed in
the Kokang region, while
grave, will pale before
those that are to come in
the much higher
populated Wa hills
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Often the argument is heard that the Wa author-
ities and the SPDC military government are will-
ing now to phase out opium/heroin production
because they have shifted their illegal income
sources to the more profitable methampheta-
mine production. In South-East Asia Ampheta-
mine-type Stimulants (ATS) are the first drug of
choice, before opiates. Especially Thailand is liv-
ing through an exceptional epidemic of the local
methamphetamine tablets called ya ba (‘crazy
medicine’), containing usually a high percentage
(up to 70%) of caffeine. In East Asia the high-puri-
ty crystal methamphetamine (ice or shabu) is the
more popular form available.
Worldwide, production and consumption of ATS
is the fastest growing illicit market. UNODC esti-
mates global ATS production –including ecstasy-
very roughly around 500 tons a year, with more
than 40 million people having used them in the
past 12 months. “Almost all of the ATS market
value is profit. Equipment and, in most locations,
labour are inexpensive. Less than one kilogram of
drug, sold on the illicit market, typically pays eas-
ily for the initial investment of setting-up a small-
scale clandestine laboratory.”1 The greatest run-
ning cost is that of the chemical precursors
required in manufacturing. For methampheta-
mine the main precursors are ephedrine or pseu-
doephedrine, mainly produced in China and
India, normally priced about 65-100 USD/kg but
on the illicit market traded for prices up to 2,000-
3,000 USD/kg.
Unlike cocaine and heroin, whose production is
limited by geography and climate, synthetic drugs
can be produced anywhere. In 2001, for example
in the United States some 8,000 kitchen-style
small methamphetamine laboratories were esti-
mated to be in production. Labs have mush-
roomed in Burma, especially near the Thai bor-
der, to service the huge demand there. Up until
1996/97, large-scale manufacturing sites existed
in central Thailand and the move to Burma seems
in part a response to enhanced Thai law enforce-
ment. Ya ba labs continue to exist in Thailand on
a smaller scale, as evidenced by seizures of mix-
ing and tabletting machines with dies and punch-
es for the typical ‘wy’ logo seen in South-East Asia,
often erroneously described as being the brand
name for Wa produced ya ba. Similarly, the “devel-
opment coincides with the crackdown on
methamphetamine manufacture in China since
1998, when a number of high-capacity metham-
phetamine laboratories were seized in that coun-
try.”2 According to the authorities this also caused
the sharp rise in methamphetamine production
in The Philippines at the end of the nineties.
There is no doubt that several labs do function in
Wa controlled territory and examples have been
documented of Wa military and SPDC military
involved in protection of labs and trans-ship-
ments. About 700 million tablets are thought to
be shipped from Burma nowadays across the
border into Thailand, corresponding to about 20
tons of methamphetamine or 7.5% of global man-
ufacture. Huge profits are earned in the process
corrupting many local authorities, police, custom
and military officers on both sides of the border.
ATS production is a highly competitive and
volatile market, the mainly ethnic Chinese traf-
ficking networks easily move production else-
where and new groups enter the market con-
stantly. The dynamics of the trade are quite dif-
ferent compared to the opium economy. As
UNODC country representative Jean-Luc
Lemahieu stated “Opium in essence is about
poverty, whereas ya ba is about greed”.3
1 Ecstasy and Amphetamines: Global Survey 2003, UNODC September 2003.
2 Ibidem.
3 Making Inroads. Interview with Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Aung Zaw,The Irrawaddy,Vol. 11 No. 4, Chiang Mai, May
2003.
The Ya Ba Market
Alternative Development 
Operating under the UNODC umbrella, the
United Nations International Drug Control
Programme (UNDCP) in 1998 started the Wa
Alternative Development Project (WADP)
with the objective of supporting the commit-
ment of the Wa authorities to have their
region opium-free by 2005.19 The project
intends to improve food security, alternative
livelihoods and the basic improvement of liv-
ing conditions, health care and education for
about 6,250 families in four townships (Ho
Tao, Mong Phen, Mong Pawk and Mong Khar)
in the Southern part of Special Region 2, con-
trolled by the United Wa State Army since the
1989 ceasefire.
The Wa project, scheduled to continue until
2005, represents the biggest Alternative
Development drug control effort in Burma to
date, though pledged funds are still far under
the estimated requirements. “Working in the
Wa with leaders trained in the top-down culture
of Communist China in the 1980s”, conditions
for the project have been extremely difficult
from the very start. According to the evalua-
tion report: “Obstacles facing this work are
greater that that of any other UNODC project
since the very first it (as UNFDAC) organized in
Thailand starting in 1971.”20 Once, in 2000, the
project was temporarily halted, after the Wa
Security Brigade took project staff hostage at
a detoxification centre.
Initially, the Wa authorities were only interest-
ed in the infrastructure components of the
project, like road construction.Tensions arose
due to the project’s intended ‘participatory
approach’, which was seen as potentially
undermining to their authority in the region.
Community development activities got off
the ground, after difficult negotiations, in only
four of the villages. The absence of a serious
participatory community-based approach was
strongly criticised by the external evaluation
in 2003.The pilot activities in this field, how-
ever, have been successful in terms of build-
ing confidence with the Wa authorities,which
are allowing the project to extend communi-
ty development work to 15 villages next year.
The announced 2005 ban is hanging like a
Sword of Damocles over the project. Origi-
nally UNDCP staff promoted the idea of a
clear deadline, as it has done in many other
countries. The public announcement of the
2005 ban came shortly after a meeting in June
1995 between Wa representatives, military
government officials and UNDCP represen-
tatives, which also marked the start of draft-
ing and negotiating the UNODC project. On
the Wa side, there has been a clear link
between expectations concerning interna-
tional assistance, and their determination to
enforce the ban. By now, however, current
UNODC project co-ordinators clearly feel
uneasy about the prospect of imposing a ban
long before the Alternative Development
process can generate the conditions to sus-
tain its success.
The problematic relationship between the
UNODC project and the 2005 ban makes it
exceptional compared to many other Alter-
native Development projects. The project
itself does not have to create the conditions
that allow for a gradual decline in opium pro-
duction. That decline is basically ensured by
the Wa authorities through enforcement of
the ban by repressive means, irrespective of
what happens with the project. Poppy hectare
reduction is not immediately related to suc-
cess or failure of the project in developmen-
tal terms.The Wa project can thus hardly still
be seen as falling under the definition of
‘Alternative Development’ in the sense of
aiming to reduce drug production through the
creation of alternative livelihood options for
the rural population. The imminence of the
ban has reduced its objectives to becoming
merely the provision of humanitarian assis-
tance to an economically opium-dependent
population under severe pressure to abolish
a crucial component of its survival strategy.
This involves quite a difficult shift for a devel-
opment project based on a participatory
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19 AD/RAS/96/C25, Wa Alternative Development Project, UNDCP.
20 Terminal Evaluation Report (AD/RAS/96/C25 and AD/RAS/02/G25), Report of the Evaluation Team, UNODC 5 May 2003.
approach with the involved communities.The
most immediate threat for them comes from
the implementation of the ban by the Wa
authorities, supported by the SPDC in Ran-
goon, both trying to accommodate drug con-
trol pressures from the international commu-
nity. The project’s objective to assist rather
than repress opium-dependent communities
requires now to ‘reduce the harm’ that comes
with enforcing US drug control certification
conditions and following the prevailing inter-
national ‘zero tolerance’ and deadline-orient-
ed drug control ideology.
Similar contradictions for the project result
from the Wa authorities’ policy of forced
relocation. Justified by the reasoning that con-
ditions in the Northern Wa region cannot sus-
tain current population levels if opium is taken
away from them, the Wa have, over the past
few years, ordered the relocation of some
40,000-50,000 people southward towards the
Thai border area and
into the Wa project area.
The UNODC project,
although not supportive
of these measures, feels
incapable of preventing
them, and has turned to
softening the impact of
these relocations,by pro-
viding humanitarian assis-
tance to relocated settle-
ments within the project
area. The Wa authorities originally targeted
100,000 people in the North for relocation,
but after the difficulties encountered half-
way they decided to stop. No further mass
relocations are planned according to the
authorities.21
In the midst of all these limiting conditions and
contradictions, the project is accomplishing
parts of its basic mission: increasing rice pro-
duction in the area and considerably improv-
ing health and education facilities.The scope
is still limited, since only a small proportion
of the total region faced with the ban can ben-
efit from them. Project activities are concen-
trated in only 28 out of the 328 villages in the
project area.To put it into perspective, those
28 project villages only account for about 150
hectares of opium cultivation.22 Plans are
therefore being developed to expand activi-
ties, including to the Kokang and Northern Wa
regions, to address “the special humanitarian
conditions imposed on the peoples of these
Regions because of the immediate banning of
opium in Kokang (2002) and Wa (2005). In
these Regions few of the prerequisites for sustain-
able development have been satisfactorily provid-
ed and major food shortages are looming as soon
as opium will be banned.”23
Looking towards 2005
Even the SPDC’s Central Committee for
Drugs Abuse Control (CCDAC) considers
the Wa deadline for 2005
to be highly ambitious,
and has expressed con-
cern over the hardships
it will cause the rural
population, suggesting
that prolonging the ban
by a few years would still
be in accordance with
the national targets.24
The Wa authorities are
themselves fully aware of the difficulties the
ban will cause for their population, acknowl-
edging that they are about to ‘turn over the
rice bowls of the people’.25 Nevertheless, they
maintain it is the only way for the Wa to ‘be
welcomed by the international community’.
They remain confident that the international
community, through UNODC, will assist the
population in getting through the dramatic
period to follow. This might prove to be a
grave miscalculation. The future of the
UNODC project is still highly insecure
beyond 2005,many donors feel hesitant step-
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21 Interview with UWSA Central Committee members, Panghsang, 12 September 2003.
22 Terminal Evaluation Report (AD/RAS/96/C25 and AD/RAS/02/G25), Report of the Evaluation Team, UNODC 5 May 2003.
23 AD/RAS/96/C25, Wa Drug Control Project, Revised Project Document, UNODC June 2003.
24 Interview with Police Colonels Hkam Awng and Sit Aye of the Central Committee for Drugs Abuse Control, Ran-
goon, 15 September 2003.
25 Interview with UWSA Central Committee members, Panghsang, 12 September 2003.
Few of the prerequisites for
sustainable development
have been provided and
major food shortages are
looming as soon as opium
will be banned
ping into the difficult political circumstances
surrounding it.The Wa authorities are not yet
likely to gain the international recognition they
expect in return for the steps they are tak-
ing.
There is no doubt that the ban will continue
to be enforced as planned, and every village
in the area seems keenly aware of the dead-
line. How effective the ban will be in meeting
its objectives remains unclear. Obviously, the
developmental conditions are most
unfavourable for its sustainability. A Wa pro-
ject assessment last year mentioned as one of
the risk factors: “The increase of credit offered
by traffickers to poppy farmers could annihilate
all project efforts, even activities such as the pro-
vision of alternative crops, improved livestock
activities or even credit schemes.The increase of
the opium price can make it impossible to erad-
icate without strong law enforcement interven-
tions such as forced eradication.”26The effective-
ness will largely depend of the level of repres-
sion exercised to enforce it, combined with
the expectations and faith of communities that
complying with the ban will bring developmen-
tal assistance to their villages.
The sad conclusion is that in fact no one is
likely to gain anything from the ban. Supply for
the international market (where this is sup-
posed to be mainly about) will re-establish
itself somehow. No relief should be expect-
ed in terms of reduced problems related to
heroin consumption, at least not outside the
country. Neither the Wa authorities nor the
SPDC is likely to gain any political recognition
over it, in fact both risk to sacrifice the wel-
fare of their own people for image-improve-
ment they are unlikely to be granted.Enforce-
ment of the ban will only produce losers in a
devastating humanitarian crisis.A deadlock sit-
uation has been created where the only sen-
sible and humane option would be to extend
the deadline while the ones who made the
pledge know that doing so would mean risk-
ing losing the little credibility they still have
left.
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26 Assessment on the Wa alternative development project, presented at the Feldafing conference on The Role of Alterna-
tive Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation, January 2002.
See: www.alternative-development.net
1948 Burma becomes independent. Communist Party of Burma
launches armed struggle. Start of civil war.
1949 Karen National Union starts armed struggle. KMT inva-
sion in Burma.
1962 General Ne Win takes power in military coup. Burma
becomes one-party state under Burma Socialist Pro-
gramme Party (BSPP).
1963 Ne Win introduced Ka Kwe Ye programme.
1968 CPB invasion from China into northern Shan State.
1973 Ka Kwe Ye’s ordered to disband and turn in their
weapons.
1976 Ethnic minority opposition armies form National Demo-
cratic Front (NDF).
1987 Burma applies for Least Developed Country (LDC) sta-
tus at UN.
1988 Mass-demonstrations for democracy suppressed by the
army. Thousands of civilian protesters killed, many oth-
ers put in jail. Military government reasserts power and
forms State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
1989 Aung San Suu Kyi put under house arrest. CPB collaps-
es. Wa, Kokang and Shan forces sign ceasefire agree-
ment. Burma renamed Myanmar by SLORC.
1990 Multi-party election. Opposition NLD led by Aung San
Suu Kyi win landslide victory. SLORC ignores results.
1991 Aung San Suu Kyi awarded Nobel Peace Prize. Pao and
Palaung group sign ceasefire.
1992 National Council of Union of Burma formed.
1993 National Convention starts.
1994 KIO signs ceasefire.
1995 Aung San Suu Kyi after 6 years released from house
arrest. KNU headquarter falls. NMSP and KNPP signs
ceasefire; the latter breaks down after 3 months.
1996 Khun Sa surrenders his MTA. Yawd Serk organises rem-
nants into what is later called SSA South.
1997 SLORC changes name to State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC). Burma becomes member of ASEAN. Cease-
fire talks with KNU break down.
1998 NLD and ethnic minority political parties form Commit-
tee Representing People’s Parliament (CRPP).
1999 UWSA orders relocation of Wa villagers to southern Wa
area and Thai border. SSA South launches ‘war on drugs’.
2000 Secret talks start between Aung San Suu Kyi and SPDC.
2002 Aung San Suu Kyi released after 19 months of house
arrest. Kokang opium ban officially starts.
2003 Thai government launches ‘War on Drugs’. Government
organised mob attacks Aung San Suu Kyi and her con-
voy. Aung San Suu Kyi put under house arrest again.
Talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and SPDC come to (tem-
porary) end.
2005 Opium ban for UWSA controlled areas will become effec-
tive.
Major events in recent Burmese history
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The global opium/heroin market has always been
marked by huge changes. Geographical shifts in opium
poppy cultivation have been the rule rather than the
exception. The huge rise in China after 19th century
colonial Opium Wars; the subsequent sharp decline
under communist rule and the spill-over from Yunnan
into Burma; shifts in production from Turkey to Iran
and Pakistan in the 1970s, and later to Afghanistan; the
booms in Mexico and Colombia; the virtual disappear-
ance from Thailand, etcetera. In looking at the last
decade, one feature stands out, the relatively stable
combined world production figures, averaging around
4,500 metric tons of opium a year. Twice, in 1994 and
1999, bumper harvests in Afghanistan made the graph
soar; and once, in 2001, the Taleban opium ban caused
an precipitous drop. However, these were one-year
deviations, with the market quickly re-finding its level.
The consistent decline in Burmese output since 1997
- after almost a decade of remarkably stable output of
between 1600-1800 tons - cannot simply be attributed
to policy interventions by local authorities, the mili-
tary government, or UNODC. Apart from some years
of unfavourable weather conditions, global market
trends played an important role in facilitating the
gradual decline. A key factor has been that heroin of
Burmese origin has been almost completely pushed
off the American and European markets. In the Unit-
ed States, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s
(DEA) heroin signature programme has been used to
monitor this gradual replacement. Samples from
seizures and undercover purchases tested to establish
the source country, show that “there has been a marked
trend for the Nation as a whole to substitute South
American heroin for South East Asian heroin”.1 The
most striking trend was noted in the eastern part of the
US, where several cities in 1993 were up to 90% sup-
plied by Southeast Asian (SEA) heroin, while by the end
of the decade this source provided no more than 10%.
In the course of the 1990s, the US market came to be
dominated by heroin of predominantly Colombian
origin. According to the DEA, this trend was con-
firmed nation-wide. “Sixty percent of the heroin ana-
lyzed under the HSP [heroin signature programme] in
1999 was from South America. Not only did South
American heroin have the highest average purity of all
source areas, but this was the fifth consecutive year in
which it accounted for the majority of the heroin ana-
lyzed under the program. Previously, SEA [Southeast
Asian] heroin was the most predominant; it reached its
zenith in 1993 when it accounted for 68 percent of the
heroin analyzed that year. By 1997, SEA heroin declined
to a low of 5 percent. In 1999, SEA heroin accounted for
only 10 percent of the analyzed heroin.”2 The following
year it went down further to 8%, and data of the “hero-
in samples analyzed in 2001[showed] most were South
American (56%), followed by Mexican (30%), Southwest
Asian (7%), and Southeast Asian (7%).”3 Other US
sources have mentioned source figures for Southeast
Asia as low as 1-3% since then. It is likely that nowa-
days, no more then 300-1,000 kgs of Burmese heroin
makes it to the US market, representing from 0.5% to
at most 2% of Burmese production.4
The European market, meanwhile, became saturated
with heroin originating from the Afghan opium econ-
omy, rapidly expanding from below 2000 tons in 1990
to 3,400 tons in 2002 and 3,600 tons in 2003, after pro-
duction recovered from the Taleban ban.5 The grad-
ual decline in Burmese opium production can thus
partly be explained by market adaptation, going from
the position of accommodating international demand
to only that of the region. Virtually all Burmese opium
and derived heroin is nowadays consumed in South-
east Asia, China, India, Australia and Japan. 
Market impacts of the ban
To a smaller extent, and only quite recently, the decline
can be attributed to policy interventions, especially to
the opium bans in Special Regions 4 (Eastern Shan
State) and 1 (Kokang) and some townships in Special
Region 2 (Wa) where the ban has been enforced ahead
of the announced deadline. As the full impact of the
Kokang ban becomes apparent this year, and especial-
ly after the enforcement of the Wa ban in 2005, the
1 Estimation of Heroin Availability 1996-2000, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Prepared by Abt Associates Inc.,
Washington DC, NCJ 192336 March 2002.
2 DEA, Heroin Signature Program: 1999, Drug Intelligence Brief, August 2001.
3 National Drug Threat Assessment 2003, U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,Washington DC, Jan-
uary 2003.
4 The amount of raw opium required to produce 1 kg of pure heroin is estimated to range between 10 - 17 kgs.
5 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Poppy Survey 2003, October 2003.
Burma in the Global Opiates Market
decline is expected to continue even more dramatical-
ly. Even if it as effective as anticipated, the bans will not
have any significant impact on the market outside of
the region.
The big question is how the regional market will adjust
to a potential shortage. Since the bulk of the Shan State
production appears to be consumed in China, there
will almost certainly be pressure towards a resumption
of poppy cultivation inside China to service the
domestic market. Several sources indicate this is
already happening, but no reliable figures are available
to indicate the potential extent to which this trend may
counter-balance the impact of the Burmese decline.
In addition, there is potential inside Burma itself for
the displacement of crops to other areas. 
Displacement to re-establish the balance between
production and demand within the region may take
some time. Meanwhile, cross-regional trafficking con-
nections are likely to be able to ensure heroin availabil-
ity, at least as long as there is no shortage on the glob-
al market, which depends largely on developments in
Afghanistan. Until now, according to the DEA, the
“lack of fluctuation in the street price of heroin in the
United States suggests that the supply of heroin on the
world market far exceeds demand.”6
The Taleban opium ban, in fact, represents the only
moment to date of profound impact on the global mar-
ket. In the United Kingdom, the Forensic Science Ser-
vice, monitoring heroin-purity trends in the country
registered this impact. Average purity figures showed
a remarkable decline, from 55% in the first quarter of
2001, down to 34% in the second quarter of 2002.7
Some other European countries reported minor price
increases during this period. 
The Burmese decline has been pointed to as a possi-
ble explanation for the acute heroin shortage in Aus-
tralia in 2001. Others claimed it to rather be the suc-
cess of law enforcement operations in Australia. Nei-
ther explanation has been convincingly argued.
Another reason might be an indirect effect of the
Afghan opium crash. By the end of 2000, the full effect
on traffickers of the Taleban ban was already clear,
months before the actual record-low harvest in April
2001. The panic this caused may well have prompted
international traffickers to outbid competitors on
shipments from Southeast Asia otherwise destined
for Australia to supply their European customers. Now,
after two years, the Australian ‘heroin drought’ has
largely been ‘resolved’ and the market has stabilised.8
6 DEA, , Drug Intelligence Brief, February 2001.
7 UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003, p 56.
8 Australian Illicit Drug Report 2001 – 2002, Australian Crime Commission (ACC), www.crimecommission.gov.au
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“Necessity knows no law. That is why
we deal with opium. We have to
continue to fight the evil of
communism, and to fight you must
have an army, and an army must
have guns, and to buy guns you must
have money. In these mountains the
only money is opium.” 1
KMT GENERAL TUAN SHI-WEN, 1967
he civil war in Burma has been going
on for over 50 years,and the country
has some of the longest running
insurgencies in the world.Since 1962,
Burma has lived under military rule.
Decades of civil war and government mis-
management have led to great loss of life and
property, and have caused great suffering for the
peoples of Burma.The economy is in a shambles,
and Burma, once the rice-bowl of Southeast
Asia,had to apply for Least Developed Country
(LDC) status at the United Nations in 1987.The
health and education system have all but
collapsed, while the country is facing an
HIV/AIDS epidemic.There are between 600,000
and one million Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) in the country, with another 400,000
refugees living in neighbouring countries.2
Burma is the world’s second largest producer
of illicit opium, most of which is grown in the
mountainous regions of Shan State.The country
also has very important biodiversity hotspots,
but natural resource extraction by companies
from China and Thailand threaten the remaining
forest and wildlife.3
Burma is a very ethnically diverse country,with
ethnic minorities making up some 30-40% of its
estimated 52 million population.The State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC), the current
military government, officially recognises 135
‘national races’.4 However, reliable population
figures are not available, and all data should be
treated with great caution. Administratively,
Burma is divided into 7 divisions, and 7 ethnic
minority states.The latter make up about 55%
of the land area. The main ethnic minority
groups include the Mon, Karen, Kayah, Shan,
Kachin, Chin, and Rakhine.While the majority
Burman population mainly inhabit the plains and
valleys of central Burma,most ethnic minorities
live in the surrounding hills and mountains. It is
in these ethnic minority regions where most of
the fighting has taken place,and these areas have
suffered most from years of government neglect
and the destruction associated with the civil war.
Origins of civil war
During the negotiations for independence from
the British,Burman nationalists advocated inde-
pendence as soon as possible.For ethnic minor-
ity leaders, the key issues were self-determina-
tion and autonomy, to safeguard their position
in a future Union of Burma. In 1947, the Pang-
long Agreement was signed between Burman
politicians and ethnic minority representatives
from some of the hill areas,which aimed to form
the basis for the new Union of Burma. Howev-
er, this agreement was inconsistent about the
rights of different ethnic minority groups,not all
of which were represented at the Panglong
meeting.As a result,many issues were deferred
for resolution at some future time.These con-
ditions made the country ripe for civil war,
which started shortly after independence in Jan-
uary 1948. Within a year,the whole country was
in turmoil,with the Communist Party of Burma
(CPB) going underground to fight the central
government, and mutinies in the army. Several
newly formed ethnic minority organisations
also took up arms to press their demands for
more autonomy and equal rights in the Union.
Initially these rebellions were very successful,
and at one point, the U Nu government was on
the verge of collapse when Karen forces from
the Karen National Union (KNU) laid siege to
Insein, only a few miles outside the capital Ran-
goon.Since then,however,the armed opposition
groups have largely been on the defensive mil-
itarily.
1 KMT General Tuan Shi-wen, quoted in:‘The politics of Heroin; CIA Complicity in the Global Drugs Trade’, Alfred W. McCoy, Lawrence Hill
Books, New York, 1991, p.352.
2 UN Commission on Human Rights 2002.
3 See:‘A Conflict of Interest,The uncertain future of Burma’s forests’, Global Witness, London, October 2003.
4 ‘Political situation of Myanmar and its role in the region’, Lt-Col Hla Min, Office of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Union of
Myanmar,Yangon 2001.
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In 1962,General Ne Win took power from the
U Nu government in a military coup, and cre-
ated a one-party state led by the Burma Social-
ist Programme Party (BSPP).The constitution
was abrogated, all opposition put behind bars,
and people’s attempts to organise themselves
were severely repressed.All large industries and
business enterprises were nationalised under
the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’, the BSPP’s offi-
cial doctrine. Burma was to become self-suffi-
cient, and the generals isolated the country
from the outside world.
By this time, the civil war had already spread to
Kachin and Shan State, where the Kachin Inde-
pendence Organisation (KIO) and the Shan
State Army (SSA) had started armed uprisings.
Both of them were able to expand quickly,
fuelled by the growing dissatisfaction among the
Kachin and Shan population over the unequal
position of ethnic minorities in the Union of
Burma.
CBP and the NDF Alliances
By the 1970s the Burmese army had managed
to push the KNU and the CPB out of their base
areas in the Irrawaddy Delta and the Pegu
Yomas, using the infamous ‘Four Cuts’ strategy.
This policy was aimed at cutting of the links
between the insurgents and the civilian popula-
tion (food, finance, recruits and intelligence).
These military campaigns directly targeted the
civilian population, and have resulted in the
forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of
people. The campaigns have, until today, been
accompanied by gross human rights abuses,
including extra-judicial and summary execu-
tions, torture, rape, and the confiscation of land
and property.5While the CPB forces in central
Burma never recovered from this blow, Karen
forces joined the KNU’s eastern command in
the high country along the Thai border.
The CPB’s headquarter was shifted to the
party’s newly formed Northeast Command. In
1968, thousands of CPB troops launched a suc-
cessful invasion of northern Shan State from
neighbouring China. The CPB made alliances
with a number of local ethnic Kokang,Wa and
Shan leaders, and was able to overrun Burma
Army outposts to take control of vast areas
along the China border.With full support from
China, the CPB soon became the most power-
ful military opponent of the tatmadaw, the
Burmese army.6 The CPB also tried to make
alliances with ethnic minority insurgents, offer-
ing Chinese arms and ammunition in return for
political leadership.
In 1976 the Karen National Union, New Mon
State party (NMSP) and the Karenni National
5 See for instance:‘Myanmar: Lack of Security in Counter-Insurgency Areas’,Amnesty International, London, July 2002; and: ‘Interim report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar’, United Nations General Assembly,
5 August 2003.
6 Bertil Lintner,‘The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)’, SEAP, Cornell University, New York 1990.
Elements of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese
Nationalist Army, the Kuomintang (KMT),
were responsible for first organising the
opium trade in the border regions of Burma,
Thailand and Laos. Defeated by Mao Tse-
tung’s communist forces in 1949, the KMT
withdrew to northern Burma from where it
launched a number of CIA-supported inva-
sions into China’s Yunnan Province. When
these attempts failed to gain a foothold on
Chinese soil, the KMT changed its strategy,
and started to occupy large areas of the Shan
State. After facing a joint offensive by the Chi-
nese People’s Liberation Army and the
Burmese Army, the KMT was forced to with-
draw from its bases near the Chinese border,
and settled in the Thai-Burma border region.
From there the KMT set up a successful trad-
ing network to the opium fields in northern
Shan State. Although the KMT as an armed
force has since disappeared, the local and
international trade routes and networks that
were established during that time still exist,
and many of the players in the drugs trade
originate from or had close links with the
KMT, including, notably, Wei Shueh-kang.
Ethnic Chinese networks in Burma, Thailand,
China, and Hong Kong still dominate the
international drugs trade from Burma. 
The KMT and the Opium trade
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Progressive party (KNPP), which all controlled
significant territory along the Thai border,
together with the SSA and the KIO and a num-
ber of other smaller groups, set up the Nation-
al Democratic Front (NDF), the first successful
alliance consisting solely of ethnic minority
organisations. The NDF and CPB alliances
rivalled each other in strength, but attempts to
form a united front between the CPB and the
anti-communist and pro-western NDF alliance
failed.
War economy
Following the disastrous economic policies of
Ne Win and his ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’, the
KNU eastern command set up a number of toll-
gates along the Thai border where they levied
5-10% taxes on an increasing amount of con-
sumer goods that were smuggled into Burma
through their territories.The KNU, which was
earning huge amounts of money from this trade,
had an anti-narcotics policy that officially pro-
hibited the use and trade in narcotics.
Armed groups in the Shan and Kachin State
could hardly afford such a policy. Many of the
farmers in the areas under their control depend-
ed on opium as a cash crop.A strong anti-opium
policy would also bring them into conflict with
potential allies against the government. In Shan
State most armies relied on income from the
opium trade, either by taxing farmers (mostly
in kind),providing armed escorts to opium car-
avans, providing sanctuary to heroin laborato-
ries,or by setting up tollgates at important trade
routes to Thailand.
In response to the renewed rebellion in Shan
State, one year after the coup Ne Win introduced
the Ka Kwe Ye programme. This initiative allowed
for the creation of local militias to fight the insur-
gents, in return for which help they were allowed
to rule their areas relatively undisturbed. Instead
of ‘counter-insurgency’, most of these militia’s
became heavily involved in the opium trade, and
in effect, the general lawlessness and chaos in the
Shan State only further increased. The most well
known of these Ka Kwe Ye were led by Lo Hsing-
han in the Kokang region, and by Khun Sa, based
at Loi Maw in northern Shan State. 
When Ne Win abandoned the Ka Kwe Ye pro-
gramme in 1973 and asked participants to turn in
their guns, Lo Hsing-han went underground to
join forces with his former enemies, the Shan
State Army (SSA). Together with Khun Sa’s Shan
United Army (SUA), which had gone under-
ground after Khun Sa’s arrest in 1969, the three
forces later emerged together at the Thai border
with what they claimed was the bulk of the annu-
al opium harvest, which they offered for sale at
farm-gate value to the international community
- to be destroyed - in return for assistance. After
some deliberation, the US refused the offer.
Branded ‘King of Opium’ by the US, Lo Hsing-han
was later arrested near the border by the Thai
authorities and extradited to Rangoon. After serv-
ing some years in jail, he resurfaced in 1989 as a
go-between in the government’s cease-fire nego-
tiations with the CPB breakaway groups. 
After Lo Hsing-han’s arrest, Khun Sa, who had
been released from jail in 1973 in exchange for
two Russian doctors kidnapped by his SUA,
became the new ‘King of Opium’. By the mid-
1980s, Khun Sa’s SUA had emerged as one of the
strongest armies along the Thai border by forging,
and in some cases forcing, alliances with other
Shan armed groups and former KMT forces. Khun
Sa’s headquarter was even based on Thai soil,
until 1982 when Thai Border Patrol Police
attacked it because of international embarrass-
ment. In the 1990s Khun Sa’s army, renamed the
Mong Tai Army (MTA), was firmly in control of
vast areas of land along the Thai border. In Janu-
ary 1996, after the MTA had come under
increased pressure, Khun Sa invited the Burmese
army into his headquarters Homong, and surren-
dered.
Both Lo Hsing-han and Khun Sa have, in turn,
been branded as ‘Kings of Opium’, but both of
them now live in Rangoon.  This provides just one
example of the many complicated and surprising
twists and turns in Shan insurgent politics. 
‘Kings of Opium’
Over the years, some of the armed groups
became more committed to the opium trade
than to their original political objectives. For
armed groups with a strong political agenda, the
situation in Shan State was thus always more
complicated, as the narcotics trade and insur-
gency politics became increasingly intertwined.
It remains difficult for any armed group based
in Shan State to survive without some kind of
involvement in the drugs trade.
The CPB initially tried to root out opium pro-
duction in the areas under its control, and it
introduced a crop substitution project.Howev-
er,these areas, including the Kokang and Wa hills,
consist mainly of steep mountains where most
farmers rely on opium cultivation as the only
viable cash crop in these impoverished regions.
The CPB’s policy came under strong pressure
after a plague of rats destroyed the crops in the
Wa hills in 1976, and after
China’s support to the
party started to decrease
in the early 1980s. This
forced the CPB to relax its
policy, and as a result,
opium production in its
areas immediately
increased. At the same
time, local CPB leaders
became involved in the
opium trade.7 Opium was
transported down to the Thai border were it
was sold to, among others, Khun Sa’s SUA and,
ironically, to KMT remnants.
While China gave the CPB its full backing,Thai-
land had also given tacit support to various
armed groups from Burma. Until the 1980s
almost the whole Thai-Burma border area was
under control of a wide range of insurgent
armies, including Mon, Karen, Karenni, and Shan
forces, and also Khun Sa’s SUA, and the KMT.
KNU President Bo Mya once compared his
organisation as a kind of ‘Foreign Legion’ for Thai-
land,guarding its borders and protecting it against
the communist threat during the height of the
Cold War,effectively preventing links between the
CPB and the Communist Party of Thailand.8
At the end of the Cold War, national security
priorities changed dramatically.Both China and
Thailand tried to normalise formal relations
with Burma, and sought to increase trade and
economic cooperation. At the same time sup-
port for insurgent groups diminished.
1988 demonstrations,1990 elections
Meanwhile in central Burma the deteriorating
economic situation and the repressive political
climate culminated in mass uprising in 1988.Hun-
dreds of thousands of protesters took to the
streets calling for the military government to
step down and hold multi-party elections.After
months of unrest, during which thousands of
protesters were killed, the military government,
now called the State Law and Order Restora-
tion Council (SLORC), crushed the movement.
In the 1990 elections, the
opposition National
League for Democracy
(NLD), led by Aung San
Suu Kyi, the daughter of
independence hero Aung
San,won a landslide victo-
ry. However, the SLORC
refused to hand over
power, and instead start-
ed a National Convention
to draft a new constitution. In 1991 Aung San
Suu Kyi was awarded the Noble Peace Prize.The
National Convention first convened in 1993,
with its members handpicked by the army, and
did not reflect the election results. In 1995, the
NLD withdrew from the National Convention
in protest at the political restrictions.
Cease-fire agreements
While central Burma was in turmoil, another
major development took place in the hills of
northern Burma, which was to have a deep
impact upon ethnic minority communities. In
1989 the once powerful Communist Party of
Burma (CPB) collapsed, following mutinies by
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7 Interview with former CPB officials, 2000 and 2001.
8 ‘Burma; Insurgency and the politics of Ethnicity’, Martin Smith, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1991, p.297.
“It remains difficult for
any armed group based
in Shan State to survive
without some kind of
involvement in the drugs
trade”
war-weary Kokang and Wa troops.China’s reluc-
tance to continue to support the CPB, com-
bined with the party’s tougher policy on the
opium trade adopted at the CPB’s Third Con-
gress in 1985, also greatly contributed to the
mutinies and the subsequent fall of the CPB.9
While the ageing Burmese CPB leadership was
pushed across the border to China, the SLORC
responded quickly by offering cease-fire agree-
ments to the breakaway groups.This new strat-
egy was developed by Military Intelligence chief
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt. In return, SLORC promised
aid to develop their war-torn areas.The mutineers
formed a number of new armies, such as the
Myanmar National Democratic Army (MNDA) in
the Kokang region, the United Wa State Army
(UWSA) in the Wa hills and the National Demo-
cratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in eastern Shan
State. Overnight, the Burmese army had neu-
tralised its biggest military opponent.
These truces in northern Shan State had huge
consequences for other armed groups in the
region,such as the Palaung,Shan,and Pao armed
groups, which now came under increased mili-
tary pressure from the Burmese army. Many of
them had also relied on CPB support for arms
and ammunition. Within a few years, most of
them also signed cease-fire agreements.
Some armed opposition groups wanted to use
the political momentum to make a renewed
effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict
at the negotiation table. Isolated and devastat-
ed after decades of civil war, these ethnic minor-
ity groups wanted to try a different path to polit-
ical development.They do not want to wait for
political change to come from Rangoon,but are
taking their own initiatives to rebuild their war-
torn country and promote change.
The KIO tried to convince the other NDF mem-
bers to start joint cease-fire negotiations.When
this strategy failed, the KIO signed a separate
agreement in early 1994. It was subsequently
ejected from the NDF. The KIO hopes that in
the end social,humanitarian and economic devel-
opment will lead to political development and
reconciliation. In contrast, most other NDF
members want to first reach a political settle-
ment before signing a cease-fire agreement.
The cease-fires are merely military accords,
which allow the armed groups to control their
own territory and retain their arms.The cease-
fires have brought an end to the bloodshed and
curtailed the most serious human rights abus-
es.The agreements have also facilitated easier
travel and communication among communities
in war affected areas, and have led to some
improvements in health and education services.
Furthermore, the physical reconstruction of
the war devastated areas has started.
The main shortcoming of the cease-fire agree-
ments is the lack of political development and the
absence of a peace process as a follow-up to the
agreements.The SLORC,which since the end of
1997 calls itself the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC),maintains that as a military gov-
ernment it doesn’t have the legitimacy to make
any political agreements,until the National Con-
vention has drawn up a new constitution.
The uncertainty of the situation also provides
space for many illegal activities, including drug
trafficking, logging, other black market trading,
gambling,and human trafficking.Opium produc-
tion rose significantly in the early years after
1989, as the end of hostilities provided farmers
with an opportunity to tend to their fields with-
out fearing being shot at. In such areas some of
the ceasefire groups were, at least initially,
allowed to grow and transport opium largely
unhindered by the military government.
The war along the Thai border 
With the formation of SLORC, thousands of
students and political activists fled to the liber-
ated areas of the NDF,where new organisations,
such as the All Burma Students’ Democratic
Front (ABSDF), were formed, as part of a new
alliance, the Democratic Alliance of Burma
(DAB). After the 1990 elections, a number of
politicians, most of them from the NLD, fled to
the border areas to escape arrest. In 1992 the
National Council of the Union of Burma
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9 Interview with former CPB officials, 2000 and 2001.
(NCUB), was set up at the KNU’s headquarter
in Manerplaw, which apart from most DAB
members, now also included exile politicians,
including MPs-elect.
In early 1995, following a split in the KNU that
led to the formation of the Democratic Karen
Buddhist Army (DKBA) which aligned itself
with the SLORC, the KNU’s headquarters at
Manerplaw fell. In the same year, the NMSP and
the KNPP also signed a cease-fire with the
SLORC, although the latter broke down after
three months.After talks with the KNU during
1996-97 failed to produce results, the Burmese
army launched a heavy offensive,capturing most
of the remaining KNU territory. It now oper-
ates as a guerrilla army from small bases along
the Thai border. Among the larger groups still
fighting the military government today are the
KNU, SSA South and the KNPP.
Fighting also took place in southern Shan State.
By the early 1990s, the Mong Tai Army (MTA)
had grown into a 10.000-strong army,
entrenched between the Salween River and the
Thai border.Khun Sa’s MTA,which admitted its
involvement in the opium trade,was able to buy
goods and services on the Thai market without
any problems until the early 1990s.
The unchallenged position of the MTA first
came under threat when thousands of UWSA
troops moved south to the Thai border. In
return for attacking MTA positions, the SLORC
promised the UWSA control over any territo-
ry it managed to occupy. The position of the
MTA was further weakened by an unusual offen-
sive of the Burmese army, a stricter Thai bor-
der policy, and subsequent mutinies by some of
the MTA troops. In January 1996,Khun Sa took
everybody by surprise when he invited the
Burmese army to his headquarters in Homong
near the Thai border,and surrendered his army.
According to a report by the US State Depart-
ment, the agreement with Khun Sa stipulated,
“[that] if Chang Qifu [Khun Sa] ended his insur-
gency and retired from the drug trade, the GOB
[Government of Burma] would provide him with
security in Rangoon, and allow him to conduct legit-
imate business”.10
MTA remnants that refused to surrender were
later reorganised by Yawd Serk into what is now
called the Shan State Army South (SSA South).
This army controls a number of small bases
along the Thai border, and is waging a guerrilla
war in the centre of southern Shan State. In its
counter-insurgency campaign against the SSA
South, the Burmese army has forcibly relocat-
ed over 300.000 civilians.
The SSA South has launched its own war on drugs,
attacking various amphetamine factories and
transport routes near the Thai border, and has
asked for international support. Fighting between
the SSA South and the Burmese army, and some-
times with the UWSA, led to a number of bor-
der clashes between the Burmese and Thai army
in 2001 and 2002. The SPDC accuse the Thai
authorities of supporting the SSA South.The Thai,
from their side, claim the SPDC is condoning the
UWSA smuggling of narcotics into Thailand.
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10 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1, 2001.
In the late 1980s, among the first to produce
methamphetamines, or ya ba (‘crazy medi-
cine’) as it is called in Thailand, was Wei
Shueh-kang, an ethnic Chinese who came to
Burma with the KMT. This followed an
approach by ethnic Chinese and Thai busi-
nessmen. Khun Sa’s MTA involvement in ya
ba dates back to 1995, one year before he
surrendered. After the surrender of the MTA,
the group disintegrated and some ya ba pro-
ducers moved to the Wa region, some to
Kokang area, while others remained on their
own. Wei Shueh-kang moved to the Wa area
in 1995, after he and his brothers came into
conflict with Khun Sa’s aides. Wei Shueh-kang
was given control over the UWSA area around
the town of Mong Yawn, near the Thai border,
a year later. He has been indicted by a US
court on heroin-trafficking charges. The
UWSA is not one homogenic group, and the
UWSA headquarter in Panghsang has had
some difficulty in controlling Wei Sheuh-
kang’s Brigade near the Thai border, as well as
the UWSA Security Brigade based in Mong
Phen. 
Ya ba and the Wei brothers
Since 1999, the UWSA has ordered the reloca-
tion of tens of thousands of Wa villagers from
their mountainous homelands into the fertile
valley of southern Shan State, in some cases forc-
ing its original Shan, Lahu and Akha habitants
out.The UWSA leadership say the objective is
to move poppy growers and impoverished vil-
lages to areas where they can grow other
crops.11 It also strengthens the UWSA’s con-
trol over this strategic border area that contains
important drugs-trafficking routes into Thai-
land.
Stagnation
Efforts by the NLD, and also by several ethnic
minority political parties that won seats in the
1990 election, to pursue their political agenda
have been met with repression and mass arrests.
In 1998 they jointly formed the Committee Rep-
resenting People’s Parliament (CRPP) in an
attempt to break the deadlock, but this result-
ed in a new wave of arrests.
The political stagnation continues. At the end
of 2000, talks between opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi and the SPDC raised hopes at home
and abroad of the possibility for a peaceful
political transition. This so-called dialogue
process has however not gone beyond the stage
of confidence building. In May 2002, Aung San
Suu Kyi was released from 19 months of house
arrest,and the pressure on the NLD decreased.
She was able to visit several States and Divisions,
drawing increasingly large crowds. On May 30,
2003 her convoy was attacked by a government-
organised mob.An unknown number of people
were killed, and Aung San Suu Kyi was again put
under house arrest.
By 2003 the military government, led by Senior
General Than Shwe, is still firmly in control. At
the time of writing, the dialogue has stopped,
and it remains unclear whether it can be revived.
In August 2003 the head of the Military Intelli-
gence General Khin Nyunt announced that
democracy would be restored, but did not give
any timetable. Repression against the NLD has
intensified, and 1300 political prisoners, among
them many NLD members and student activists,
remain in jail. Human rights violations by the
Burmese army against the civilian population in
ethnic minority areas continue unabated.
Who is to blame?
After the surrender of Khun Sa and his MTA,
the UWSA has been demonised by the US and
international media as the biggest drugs army in
the world. The UWSA has been accused of
large-scale involvement in the opium and
methamphetamine trade.
“[The UWSA is] a formidable force of tribal soldiers
dubbed by the US State Department as the world’s
‘most heavily armed narco-traffickers”...”How did a
once isolated hill tribe grow so powerful, so quickly,
transforming itself into an international crime syn-
dicate to rival Colombia’s drugs cartel?” read an
article in Time Asia magazine.12
Although the Wa are certainly not innocent, the
politics of the drugs trade are extremely com-
plicated, and many actors in Burma are involved
in one way or another.The Wa do not control
the trade; that is the preserve of ethnic Chinese
networks that were first established by the KMT.
It is there that the main profits are being made.13
“Frankly speaking, we do admit that up to 1998
we had some heroin refinery and amphetamine fac-
tory in our Wa region.Our Wa Central Authority got
some tax from those businesses involved in that.But
after that we announced that all heroin and ATS
refineries are banned in the whole Wa area. Now
we do feel unfairly treated by the international media
that our Wa organisation is still involved.We have a
large border area, and other groups can also make
it and bring it to neighbouring countries. It is a big
image problem for us, but our commitment for the
2005 ban is strong.”14
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11 Interview with UWSA Central Committee member Shao Min Liang, Panghsang, 12-09-03.
12 ‘Soldiers of Fortune’, Andrew Marshall and Anthony Davis,Time Asia, 16-12-02.
13 For a detailed study on Chinese syndicates and their involvement in the drugs trade see:‘Blood Brothers; Crime, Business and
Politics in Asia’, Bertil Lintner, Silkworm Books, Chiangmai, 2002.
14 Interview with UWSA Central Committee member Shao Min Liang, Panghsang, 12-09-03.
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Even Yawd Serk, whose SSA South has fought
several battles with the UWSA, agrees that the
Wa are not the main culprit:
“It is not fair to blame the Wa [for the drugs trade],
you should blame individuals.The Wa are just hon-
est hill people, they have no capability to get the
drugs and send it to Bangkok and the United
States.They are just scapegoats.The benefits go to
the Chinese businessmen and the SPDC. How can
the Wa send drugs to Bangkok?”15
According to Col. Hkam Awng of the SPDC
Central Committee for Drugs Abuse Control
(CCDAC):
“In the Thai media the UWSA are accused of being
the main drugs producing group. But along the Thai
border there are lots of other groups.Some of them
are peace groups, some are still fighting.Others are
not even armed groups, just Chinese [organisa-
tions]… The majority of the Amphetamine Type
Stimulants (ATS) producers
are ethnic Chinese, and
most syndicates are Chi-
nese. Many of them are
involved in drugs producing
and trafficking. They have
good connection and financ-
ing from abroad. It is difficult
for us to penetrate in their
circles.They sent their repre-
sentatives to Myanmar to do
their business, and they are
very strong.”16
The view that Chinese gangs are behind the drug
trade, especially the ya ba, now also seems to
be shared by the Thai authorities.17
Although the SPDC officially aims to eradicate
narcotics, there have been many claims about its
own involvement in the opium business. In its
most recent report, the US State Departments
says that there is no evidence that senior
Burmese Government officials are directly
involved in the drugs trade.However, the report
states,“Lower ranking officials, particularly corrupt
army personnel posted in outlying areas,have been
prosecuted for drug abuse and/or narcotics-related
corruption”.18 The report continues, “no Burma
Army officer over the rank of full Colonel has ever
been prosecuted for drug offences in Burma.This
fact, the prominent role in Burma of the family of
notorious narcotics traffickers (e.g., Lo Hsing-han
Clan), and the continuance of large-scale narcotics
trafficking over years of intrusive military rule have
given rise to speculation that some senior military
leaders protect or are otherwise involved with nar-
cotics traffickers.”19
The investment of drugs money into the formal
Burmese economy has also increased significant-
ly since the 1990s. In the same 1998 report, the
US State Department warns, “There is reason to
believe that money laundering in Burma and the
return of narcotics profits laundered elsewhere are
significant factors in the overall Burmese economy”.
In the complexities of
Burma’s ethnic conflict
and decades-old civil war,
it is has been convenient
to put all the blame on
‘Kings of Opium’ or
‘narco-armies’, ignoring
the realities of the nar-
cotics trade in Burma. As
Martin Smith wrote more
than a decade ago:
“In the absence of any real anti-narcotics pro-
grammes in the hills, it is easier for the US Drugs
Enforcement Agency, the UN and the governments
of Thailand to blame ‘kingpins’ and ‘bandits’ rather
than seriously investigate a trade that comes dan-
gerously close to upper echelons of power”.20
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15 Interview with SSA South Commander Col.Yawd Serk, 03-09-03.
16 Interview with Col. Hkam Awng, SPDC Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC),Yangon 15-09-03.
17 ‘Mixed Progress for Yangon’s drug war’, Larry Jagan, Asia Times, 09-05-03.
18 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2002, U.S. Department of State,Washington, March 2003.
19 Ibid.
20 ‘Burma; Insurgency and the politics of Ethnicity’, Martin Smith, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1991, p.315.
It is easier to blame
‘kingpins’ and ‘bandits’
rather than seriously
investigate a trade that
comes dangerously close to
upper echelons of power
“[While] the humanitarian aspects
of the drugs problem are
recognised, its political dimensions
are often ignored. A common line of
argument holds that the drugs
control problem should only be
addressed after significant political
reforms have taken place, for fear of
delaying or hindering political
development in the country. Indeed,
action against drug producing,
trafficking and consumption should
not supersede the need for reform in
Myanmar. Yet there is no
contradiction here. In discussing
drug policy in Myanmar it is
important to recognise that the
current drug situation actually
hinders the transition process.”1
he response of the international
community to bring about political
change and national reconciliation
in Burma has followed different
approaches, and has been divided
over goals and strategy. While the US,EU and
other western countries have generally advo-
cated a policy of isolation and sanctions,
ASEAN member states, China and Japan have
argued for engagement to bring about change
in Burma.The failure of the international com-
munity to formulate and implement a coor-
dinated and common policy also has repercus-
sion for drugs control in Burma.
United States 
The United States (US) has put a tough sanc-
tions regime in place, which is clearly linked
to the failure of the military government to
make progress in the areas of democratisa-
tion, human rights, and drugs eradication. In
1997 the Clinton Administration issued a ban
on new US investment in Burma, due to the
lack of democratic reform, continuing human
rights abuses, and the lack of cooperation
from the regime to combat the growing drug
problem. In 2003 President Bush declared
that Burma, together with Haiti and
Guatemala, “failed demonstratively to adhere to
their obligations under international counter-nar-
cotics agreements and to take the measures set
forth in US anti-drug law”.
Since 1988 the US government has suspend-
ed all direct counter-narcotics assistance.The
US now engages the military government in
Rangoon on a very limited level on drugs con-
trol issues.The US has since 1988 also not cer-
tified the Burmese government as cooperat-
ing in narcotics eradication, meaning comply-
ing with UN treaty conventions and in accord
with the US government’s priorities in the
War on Drugs. In late 2002 prospects for a
certification loomed, for the first time in 15
years. Both the US State Department and the
US Embassy in Rangoon showed signs that
Washington moved towards certifying. How-
ever, lobbying from the US Senate and House
of Representatives, highlighting human rights
abuses committed by the SPDC and the polit-
ical impasse in the country, was a key factor
in the final decision to deny certification once
again.
After the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and
other NLD members on May 30, 2003 the US
President signed into legislation the banning
of imports from Burma, the banning of finan-
cial transactions with Burma and the banning
of representatives of the regime from enter-
ing the US.This new law closely links sanctions
to democratic developments and the extra-
dition of  ‘Opium King’ Khun Sa to the US.2
In 2003 the US placed the United Wa State
Army (UWSA) on the drug kingpin list.
European Union 
The European Union (EU) has formulated its
policy on Burma in its Common Foreign and
Security Position (CFSP),mostly referred to as
the Common Position. Since 1996 the Com-
mon Position has been strengthened on sev-
eral occasions. Measures currently included
T
N
I
A  P O L I T I C I S E D  D E B AT E
S a n c t i o n s , H u m a n i t a r i a n  A i d  a n d  D r u g  C o n t r o l
D r u g s  a n d  C o n f l i c t  n o  9  -  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3 23
1 Strategic Programme Framework UN Drug Control activities in Myanmar, October 2002.
2 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1, 2001.
are mainly an arms embargo,a visa ban for rep-
resentatives of the regime and people with big
business interests, and the freezing of their
assets in Europe.Within the Common Position
there has always been space for humanitarian
aid, for programmes in support of poverty
alleviation and the provision of basic needs for
the poorest sections of the population.
Despite pressure from the West, Burma was
accepted into ASEAN in 1997.As a result EU-
ASEAN meetings were cancelled until 1999.
The EU sent a number of officials delegations
to Burma, the so-called Troika Missions, to try
to establish ‘a meaningful political dialogue
with the SPDC’ to promote political recon-
ciliation and explain the aims of the EU’s pol-
icy towards Burma. The EU has also looked
into the possibility of increasing humanitari-
an aid to Burma, particularly for HIV/AIDS,
without relaxing its sanction regime.3
After the May 30 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi
and her convoy, the EU further strengthened
its Common Position by extending the visa
ban to now also include families of SPDC min-
isters, deputy ministers, ex-ministers, and
senior military officers.Their assets were also
frozen.4
ASEAN, China, India and Japan
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) member states have advocated a
less confrontational approach.They have fol-
lowed a policy of ‘constructive engagement’
and of non-interference in internal affairs,
which in some cases has been criticised as an
excuse to do business as usual.
In 1997 ASEAN opened up their organization
and allowed Burma to become a member.
Most ASEAN nations, in particular Thailand,
Singapore and Malaysia, have been eager to
invest in Burma. However, there have been
some rifts in ASEAN’s alliance with Burma
over the years, the sharpest differences being
around ASEAN’s condemnation of Burma
after the May 30 events.
Economically and politically,China is the most
strategic ally of the SPDC, and its main sup-
plier of arms.The increasing Chinese influence
in Burma is a matter of great concern for
India. In recent years the Indian government
has sought to improve relationships with
Burma. A number of insurgent groups are
active on the Indian side of the border; some
of them also have bases in Burma. Japan is
Burma’s largest aid donor, but after the attack
on Aung San Suu Kyi on May 30 all pro-
grammes were suspended.
Impact of drugs trade in region
Burma’s internal problems have become more
and more worrisome for the region. The
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Burma does not con-
fine itself to Burma’s borders, and while
Burma’s drugs used to find their way outside
the region, more and more of them are being
consumed within the region itself, causing
severe social problems.
While China, Thailand and India originally
functioned as drug transporting routes, last-
ing recent years they have developed into a
huge drug-consuming market.All three coun-
tries have witnessed an alarming growth in
their drug addicted population. The flow of
opium and heroin, but especially of millions of
methamphetamines pills, called ya ba in Thai-
land (‘crazy medicine’), across the border
from Burma has become the main Thai nation-
al security concern. Since 1996 the usage of
methamphetamines in Thailand has grown
tremendously.The Thai market is estimated at
700 million pills in 2002 – that is 10 pills for
every man, woman and child.5
The relationship between Thailand and Burma
is very tense when it comes to the drug
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Pacific’, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, to be published in early 2004.
4 Ibid.
5 Prof. Prasuk Phongpaichit. Paper presented at the Lisbon International Symposium on global drug policy,The Senlis Council, 23-25
October 2003.
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issue.Thailand blames Burma for failing to con-
trol the production and flow of narcotics into
Thailand.The SPDC says Thailand is support-
ing the SSA South.This has led to several bor-
der conflicts in 2001 and 2002. More recent-
ly, however, relations have improved.
The Thai ‘war on drugs’
On the 1st of February 2003 the Thai govern-
ment launched a new phase in the war on
drugs, which according to Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra has been a great success
and the first step towards a drug-free coun-
try by the end of this year. Human rights
groups have strongly criticised the campaign,
accusing authorities of orchestrating a wave
of extra-judicial killings that reached a death
toll of 2,300 suspected drugs dealers in the
first three months of the campaign. Accord-
ing to the Thai authorities these are mainly the
settlement of internal disputes in the drug
gangs. Information about what has really been
happening is difficult to come by.This campaign
is sufficiently intimidating to deter journalists,
or anyone else, from engaging in in-depth
investigations. As a Thai academic recently
stated:
“Many of those arrested or killed seem to have
been small users or dealers. Probably they were
the very bottom level of the sales pyramid.A lead-
ing forensic expert stated publicly that the author-
ities in specific areas seemed to be able to turn
the killings on or off like a switch.This could be
explained by the fact that there is a very, very fine
line dividing the police from unofficial means of
enforcement. Thailand has a lot of professional
gunman organised into units controlled by pow-
erful figures. Some policemen moonlight as mem-
bers of these units.”6
After being heavily criticised, the government
decided to back off and the daily reporting of
killings stopped.Since then, the original 3-month
deadline was extended to the end of the year.
China’s crackdown
There has been an alarming increase in hero-
in trafficking in China. It appears that a trans-
China route has replaced the transit through
Thailand as the main channel of shipment for
Burmese heroin to the rest of the world.
Large amounts end up for sale inside China,
leading to an increase of HIV/AIDS epidemics
among intravenous drug users in China,while
the rest is re-exported through China’s
Northwest Xingjian’s region, Hong Kong or
even Beijing and Shanghai.A growing affluence
of Chinese society and market size provides
a very attractive demand for drug producers.
The number of drug seizures in Yunnan
province more than doubled between 1995
and 2002.
After its 1949 revolution China succeeded in
ridding the country of opiates, except for
some isolated areas in Yunnan, through harsh
laws combined with revolutionary ideas.The
spread of HIV/AIDS in Yunnan, following the
reopening of trade between China and Burma,
has caused considerable concern in China.
Overall,China has been very tough with drug
traffickers, who face the death penalty if
apprehended. In fact, one of the drug traffick-
ers executed in 1994 was Yang Mouxian,
younger brother to Yang Mouliang, a Kokang
ceasefire leader. China has often expressed
disappointment with what they feel are Ran-
goon’s half-hearted anti-drug efforts.The cur-
rent presence of People’s Liberation Army
troops in place of the usual paramilitary police
along the Shan State-Yunnan border could be
seen as an indication of Beijing’s tougher
stance.7 China is a co-signatory to the Wa
Alternative Development Project.This enabled
the project to make use of the Chinese bank-
ing and telephone system, and allowing for
travelling and transportation of goods through
Chinese territory. China has hosted several
regional meetings on drug control since,which
indicates China’s support for regional anti-nar-
cotics efforts.
6 Ibid.
7 Interview with representative of S.H.A.N., November 9, 2003 
Regional drugs control initiatives
Several drugs-control initiatives have been
taken in the region. This includes the six-
nation UNODC Sub-Regional Action Plan,
signed by Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos,
China, and Cambodia, which aims to control
chemical trafficking and narcotics production
in the region.
Another regional initiative is the ASEAN and
China Cooperative Operations in Response
to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD). ACCORD
rests on four pillars: advocating civil awareness
on the dangers of drugs and social responses
to drug-related prob-
lems; building consensus
and sharing best prac-
tices on demand reduc-
tion; and strengthening
the rule of law by an
enhanced network of
control measures and
eliminating the supply of
illicit drugs by boosting
alternative development
programmes and community participation in
the eradication of illicit crops. 8 In 1998,
Burma was a co-signatory with other ASEAN
countries of the Joint Declaration on a Drug
Free Zone in ASEAN by the year 2015.
United Nations
It was the UN Special Envoy to Burma, Raza-
li Ismael, who is credited of brokering talks
between the SPDC and opposition leader
Aung San Suu Kyi.The contents of these talks,
which started in the end of 2000, have not
been made public. Razali has visited the coun-
try several times since, to try and move them
beyond the confidence-building stage.Howev-
er, after the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and
her convoy by a government-organised mob
on May 30, 2003, the talks may have come to
an end. UN Special Rapporteur on the Situa-
tion of Human Rights in Myanmar has also paid
several visits to Burma, most recently in
November 2003.He has called for the release
of all political prisoners, for the release of Aung
San Suu Kyi from house arrest, and for the dia-
logue to resume.
Burma has also been prominent on the agen-
da of other international organizations.
Amongst others, this includes the Internation-
al Labour Organisation (ILO). After an inves-
tigation into the use of forced labour in
Burma, they concluded this constituted a
‘crime against humanity’. In 2000, the ILO took
the unprecedented step of recommending to
its members, as well as to UN agencies and
multilateral organisations, a review of their
relations with Burma to ensure that they did
not contribute to forced
labour in Burma.
The Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laun-
dering (FATF) recently
downgraded Burma to
‘least cooperative coun-
try’, calling for measures
against Burma because
its failure to establish a
framework to engage in effective internation-
al cooperation in the fight against money
laundering.
The Aid debate
Burma is in a deep socio-economic crisis, but
the question of whether, and how, the inter-
national community should channel interna-
tional assistance to Burma is very politicised
and has been subject to lengthy and heated
debate. Critics say humanitarian aid is only
supporting and legitimising the military gov-
ernment, and claim it is not possible to reach
the target population. They also feel it is
impossible to carry out adequate monitoring.
In contrast, international NGOs working in
the country, supported by an increasing num-
ber of newly formed local community-based
organisations, argue that it is possible to
directly reach those in need with humanitar-
ian aid, and that their presence on the ground
actually increases the space for others to
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8 Strategic Programme Framework UN Drug Control activities in Myanmar, October 2002.
“The nature and
magnitude of the
humanitarian situation
does not permit delaying
until the political
situation evolves”
work in.There is also a strong feeling that it
is not right to punish the poor for the failures
of the government, by denying them aid at a
time the country is in the grip of an enormous
humanitarian crisis.9
In 1998 Aung San Suu Kyi said in an interview
that it was not the right time for internation-
al NGOs to come into Burma, and advised
them to go and assist the refugees on the Thai
border.10 But the position of the NLD on
humanitarian aid has remained ambiguous.
After her release from house arrest in May
2002 Aung San Suu Kyi said that:
“We have never said no to humanitarian aid as
such.We have always said humanitarian aid must
be given to the right people in the right way,which
of course calls for accountability and transparen-
cy.And of course we always say that the minimum
necessary requirement is independent monitoring,
and this has been our stand throughout. If peo-
ple thought that we simply said no to humanitar-
ian aid it was a misunderstanding of our position,
because we have never said that.”11
Since the mid-1990s, Burma has received USD
50 million per year in official development
assistance.This amounts to just USD 1 per capi-
ta, much less than any comparable country in
the region.Specifically in the area of HIV/AIDS,
the combined budget of all national and inter-
national organisations in 2000 was around USD
3 million, or only 2.5 per cent of the budget in
Thailand, which had a similar epidemic.12
In June 2001 the heads of eight UN Agencies
operating in Burma wrote an open letter to
their head offices overseas and described the
situation as being “on the brink of a humani-
tarian crisis” and called for “a dramatic over-
haul of budget allocations to Myanmar”.“Under
these circumstances”, they argued, “humanitari-
an assistance is a moral and ethical
necessity…the nature and magnitude of the
humanitarian situation does not permit delaying
until the political situation evolves”.13
It appears that on the international level, a shift
in attitude is underway, although the May 30
events followed by the renewed house-arrest
of Aung San Suu Kyi has led to a (temporary)
halt of aid again from some donor countries.
Over recent years, a number of governments
and international organisations have paid vis-
its to Burma to explore ways to give assis-
tance.The EU in 2001 modified its Common
Position, making space for EU and bilateral
funding for HIV/AIDS programs. The British
government is currently reassessing its bilat-
eral program.
Call by ethnic minority groups
After the first ceasefire agreements were
signed, many of these armed groups priori-
tised the social development of their areas,
which have suffered from years of civil war and
government neglect. They have asked the
international community for assistance, and
have welcomed community development pro-
grammes by the UN, international NGOs and
some new local community-based initiatives.
Among the ceasefire groups, especially those
with strong political agendas, there is a grow-
ing sense of frustration about the lack of
international support and understanding of
the impact of the truces. As a Kachin devel-
opment worker wrote:
“Many ethnic minority groups feel extremely dis-
appointed that in general foreign governments are
not responding to the progress of these ceasefires
or indeed even understand their significance or
context. Rather it seems that certain sectors of
the international community have the fixed idea
that none of the country’s deep problems, includ-
ing ethnic minority issues, can be addressed until
there is an overarching political solution based
upon developments in Yangon. In contrast, the
ceasefire groups believe (and now there are over
fifteen of them) that simply concentrating on the
political stalemate in Yangon and waiting for polit-
ical settlements to come about – however long
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9 ‘Burma/Myanmar; Ethnic Conflict and Military Rule’,Tom Kramer, op.cit.
10 Marc Purcell, Axe-Handles or Willing Minions?: International NGOs in Burma, in: Strengthening Civil Society, p 82.
11 An interview with Aung San Suu Kyi,Tony Broadmore, Irrawaddy, April 2002.
12 UNAIDS,The United Nations Joint Action Plan on HIV/AIDS 2001-2002, p. 9, quoted in ‘Myanmar:The Politics of Humanitarian
Aid’, International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No 32, April 2002, p 7.
13 Ibid p 7
this takes – is simply not sufficient to bring about
the scale of changes that are needed. It ignores
realities in areas long affected by war on the
ground.”14
A change of thinking is also taking place among
some representatives of the Burmese commu-
nity in exile. As Harn Yawnghwe, director of
the Euro Burma Office in Brussels, recently
stated:
“Many Burmese within the exiled communities will
say that what is needed now, immediately, is not
assistance but strong and determined action to
ensure that the political situation will change.They
will say that without change, we would only be
dealing with the symptoms and not with the root
cause of the problem. However, at the same
time, we cannot ignore the humanitarian need in
Burma and assume that everything will work itself
out once political change occurs.The list of what
is wrong is endless. (…) The crisis must be tack-
led now if it is to be contained and if it is not to
destabilise the region.”15
Support to drug programmes
The UN has carried out projects to suppress
narcotics in Burma since the early 1970s
through the United Nations Fund for Drug
Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and later the UN
Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), cur-
rently operating under the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Pro-
jects ranged from crop replacement,develop-
ment programs,opium surveys and education.
The UNODC is limited by its mandate to drug
demand issues and decreasing opium cultiva-
tion through developmental means, and does
not have the power to intervene in the wider
law enforcement context. The agency has
been criticised for not paying equal attention
to the amphetamine type stimulants (ATS)
production in Burma.
Some smaller initiatives also exist. These
include a small-scale UNDCP project in the
Kokang region that ran until 2002,“a small,US-
financed project in Northern Shan State (‘Project
Old Soldier’), and a Japanese effort to establish
buckwheat as a cash crop in the Kokang and
Mong Ko regions in North-eastern Shan State. In
addition, the Thai government agreed in 2001 to
extend its own alternative development projects
across the border into the Wa-controlled South-
ern Military Region of Shan State”.16 Thailand
committed USD 440.000 to this cross-border
effort.
Leading sponsors of the current UNODC
programme in Burma are Japan and the US,
followed by Australia. Germany and Italy are
new donors to the programme, having con-
tributed since 2002. All together, in 2002, the
UNODC in Burma received USD 2.3 million.
UNODC estimates that the programme
needs USD 26 million for the next five years,
mainly to cover humanitarian intervention.Of
this amount, about USD 5 million has been
allocated, leaving a huge shortfall in funding.17 
Beyond a stand off in drugs policy
The standoff continues between those who
want to withhold aid from the SPDC until
there is substantial political and economic
reform, and those who want to give aid now
because of Burma’s great humanitarian crisis,
and heavily influences the drugs-policy debate.
The UNODC and its donors believe that it is
important to carry out drugs-control pro-
grammes in Burma for humanitarian as well
as political reasons:
“Myanmar’s drug control situation is of major
international, regional and national concern.At the
humanitarian level, food insecurity and the rapid
spread of HIV/AIDS are significant factors. For
instance, of the officially reported HIV cases, 30%
are attributed to injecting drug use.At the politi-
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Rule’, Hurst & Company, London, 2001, p 161.
15 Harn Yawnghwe, from his speech ‘Possibilities and dilemma’s of humanitarian assistance to Burma’ delivered at the Burma Day
2003: Political and humanitarian options for the international community, October 8 2003 Brussels/Belgium.
16 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2002,US Department of State,Washington, March 2003.
17 The Irrawaddy, May 2003 
cal level, drugs are causing regional instability and
hinder a sound domestic political transition.”18
Critics believe that the military government
is itself caught up in the drug business, bene-
fiting at an individual and possibly also insti-
tutional level, and that it is not genuine in its
efforts to eradicate drugs.They argue that the
activities of the military government to pro-
mote drugs eradication are largely window-
dressing that divert attention from the main
players and real dynamics of the trade.They
also feel that the military government should
itself first increase its own allocations of
resources before foreign assistance is
increased.
But the debate is not that simple and until
now there are some voices that have not been
heard.While focussing heavily on Shan State,
the international community has completely
ignored drugs eradication efforts by ceasefire
groups in other areas, such as the KIO and the
New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDK-A) in
Kachin State.These groups have implement-
ed their own eradication policies without any
form of assistance from the international
community.Nor did the international commu-
nity listen to calls by armed opposition groups
for assistance in their own drugs-control
efforts. These appeals, the most recent one
made by the opposition Shan State Army
South (SSA South), have largely been ignored.
“We have found that unless we get rid of drugs,
the future of our youth is doomed.We do as much
as possible with our few resources.We try to do
our best in cooperation with the Thais to get rid
of drugs. But the Thai government has recently
changed its policy, and now they are friendlier with
the Burmese generals.With our few resources we
cannot go further, our war has come to a near
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Burma has one of the most severe HIV epidemics
in Asia due to the high prevalence of injecting
drug use and HIV among drug users. There are
approximately 150,000 to 250,000 injecting hero-
in users in the country. HIV prevalence among
them had risen in 2000 to 63%, in some areas up
to 96%, among the highest rates in the world. At
the end of 1999, it was estimated 530,000 adults
and children are infected with HIV. The annual
number of adult AIDS cases has been calculated
by UNAIDS to be 46,000 in 2000 and is projected
to reach 55,000 in 2005. High risk behaviours are
still widespread in the drug injecting tea shops or
‘shooting galleries’ where for a fee, a drug user is
administered with heroin. Sterilisation of the var-
ious injecting paraphernalia is rarely a consider-
ation. One study showed that 61% of injecting
heroin users shared their needles and syringes. 
In 2001 the government recognized that HIV was
of national concern but scant resources and the
legal constraints of narcotic laws pose major
obstacles. Drug treatment is orientated com-
pletely towards total abstinence and substitu-
tion therapy has only recently been considered on
a pilot basis. The penalties for drug use in Myan-
mar are strict as the government has criminalized
addiction. An addict must register with the
authorities and undertake inpatient drug treat-
ment. Failure to register, or being unsuccessful in
treatment, can result in a three to five year prison
sentence. It is estimated that drug offenders make
up 70% of the prison population where transmis-
sion of HIV contributes significantly to the epi-
demic. 
Current anti-drug law prohibits the making, sell-
ing, possessing or use of a hypodermic needle
without a licence, punishable with a fine and/or
six months in prison. This contributed directly to
the practice of needle sharing and therefore, in
April 2001, the Myanmar Police Force comman-
der issued instructions to no longer enforce these
stipulations, but it is not yet clear how this new
instruction will be followed.
Revisiting ‘The Hidden Epidemic’, A Situation Assessment
of Drug Use in Asia in the context of HIV/AIDS, The Cen-
tre for Harm Reduction, The Burnet Institute, Australia,
January 2002, www.chr.asn.au
Drugs & HIV/AIDS
stop, because we have no one to back us.With-
out that we have to face the drugs traders, who
are more powerful, and who have more money
than us.”19
Perhaps much more worrying is that nowhere
in the debate on international assistance to
drug eradication policies in Burma have the
interests of the opium farmers been repre-
sented. Local communities in drug growing
areas, or their representatives, have not been
able to participate in any of the decision-mak-
ing processes of anti-narcotics strategies that
have tremendous impact on their livelihoods.
In contrast to some of the other war affect-
ed areas, the Wa region does not have any
local organisations carrying out community-
based initiatives.The Wa governing structure
is very hierarchical, and so far there has been
a lack of space for independent organising
outside the existing political structure.
However, an increasing number of interna-
tional development agencies have developed
programmes, and found spaces, that enable
them to work directly with local communi-
ties in Burma,without the overt interference
of the military government. Some of them
have already been in Burma for more than 10
years, with experience of bottom-up grass-
roots development, needed to build local
organisational capacity.There are also many
newly formed community-based organisa-
tions that have started grassroots-level devel-
opment programmes in many former war
areas.
The prospects for a humanitarian disaster
caused by the 2005 opium ban is forcing the
international community to rethink its strate-
gies. It should develop a policy that supports
opium farmers, who have not only been the
victim of repressive anti-drugs policies imple-
mented by way of opium bans and interna-
tional pressure, but also of the Rangoon-
focussed political agenda and the demonising
of the ceasefire groups by the international
community.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ATS Amphetamine Type Stimulants
ABSDF All Burma Students’ Democratic Front
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party
CCDAC Central Committee for Drugs Abuse Control
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CPB Communist Party of Burma
DAB Democratic Alliance of Burma
DEA Drugs Enforcement Administration
DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
EU European Union
IDP Internally Displaced Person
ILO International Labour Organisation
KIO Kachin Independence Organisation
KMT Kuomintang
KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party
KNU Karen National Union
MNDA Myanmar National Democratic Army
MTA Mong Tai Army
NCUB National Council of the Union of Burma
NDAA National Democratic Alliance Army
NDA-K National Democratic Army – Kachin 
NDF National Democratic Front
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NLD National League for Democracy
NMSP New Mon State Party
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC State Peace and Development Council 
SSA Shan State Army
SUA Shan United Army
UN United Nations
UNDCP United Nations International Drugs Control 
Programme
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US United States
USD United States Dollar
UWSA United Wa State Army
19 Interview with SSA South Commander Col.Yawd Serk,
03-09-03.
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Burma is on the brink of yet another humanitarian
crisis. In the Kokang region, an opium ban was
enforced last year, and by mid-2005 no more
poppy growing will be allowed in the Wa region.
Banning opium from these regions in Shan State
adds another chapter to the long and dramatic
history of drugs, conflict and human suffering in
the country.
With this issue of Drugs & Conflict TNI tries to
bring nuance to the polarised debate on the
Rangoon-focussed political agenda, the demonising
of the ceasefire groups and repressive drug policy
approaches. Hundreds of thousands of people
who depend on the opium economy risk being
sacrificed in an effort to comply with international
pressures about drug-free deadlines. Community
livelihoods face being crushed between the pincers
of the opium ban and tightened sanctions.
The unfolding drama caused by the opium bans is
forcing the international community to rethink its
strategies. Enforcement of tight deadlines will
result in major food shortages and may jeopardise
the fragile social stability in the areas.To sustain
the gradual decline in opium production,
alternative sources of income for basic subsistence
farmers have to be secured. Without adequate
resources, the longer-term sustainability of ‘quick
solutions’ is highly questionable. Since military
authorities are eager to comply with promises
made, law enforcement repression is likely to
increase, with human rights abuses and more
displacement a potential outcome.
The only viable and humane option lies in a
simultaneous easing of drug control deadline
pressures and increasing international
humanitarian aid efforts. Both require stronger
international engagement of a different kind to that
we have seen so far.
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Founded in 1974,TNI is an inter-
national network of activist-
scholars committed to critical
analyses of the global problems
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to steer the world in a democra-
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policies globally, their causes and
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and democracy.
The Drugs & Democracy pro-
gramme conducts field investiga-
tions, engages policy debates,
briefs journalists and officials,
coordinates international cam-
paigns and conferences,produces
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documents,and maintains a daily
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related issues.
The aim of the project and of  the
Drugs and Conflict series is to
stimulate a re-assessment of
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principles consistent with a com-
mitment to harm reduction, fair
trade, development, democracy,
human rights,environmental and
health protection, and conflict
prevention.
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